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1 Introduction
The New-Keynesian macro model has been extended in recent years to incorporate the endoge-
nous determination of unemployment uctuations in the labor market.1 Taking the search fric-
tions approach, Walsh (2005) and Trigari (2009) introduced unemployment as the gap between
job creation and destruction that results in a labor market with real rigidities à la Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994). Alternatively, Casares (2007, 2010) and Galí (2011) assume nominal
rigidities on wage setting to produce mismatches between labor supply and labor demand that
delivers unemployment uctuations. In a recent paper, Michaillat (2012) explores the interac-
tions between search frictions, job rationing and wage rigidity and nds asymmetric patterns in
business cycle uctuations of unemployment.
This paper presents novel theoretical and empirical contributions. On the theoretical side,
our model simultaneously accommodates unemployment uctuations due to sticky wages, and
variable capital, thus a¤ecting labor-capital reallocations at the rm level. In contrast to the
vast majority of the related literature, our model generates unemployment uctuations without
resorting search frictions in the labor market. Hence, the model combines most of the nominal
and real rigidities of full-edged New-Keynesian models Calvo-type price stickiness, consump-
tion habits, investment adjustment costs, variable capital utilization, etc. , with a labor market
which generalizes that of Casares (2010) to include a rental market for capital. In that regard,
we replace the standard way of introducing wage rigidities on labor contracts set by households
(which follows the seminal paper by Erceg, Herdenson and Levin, 2000) for a labor market struc-
ture in which excess-labor-supply unemployment stems from sticky wages. As a result, wage
dynamics depend inversely upon uctuations of the rate of unemployment. We also discuss the
implications on ination dynamics: the New-Keynesian Phillips curve turns atter because of
the negative e¤ect of relative prices over relative nominal wages at the rm level.
On the empirical front, this paper includes unemployment -due to sticky nominal wages- in
estimation and provides a comparison between our proposed model and the Smets and Wouters
(2007) New-Keynesian model, which is a well-known reference model in the DSGE literature.
1Referential New-Keynesian models without unemployment are Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005),
Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) and all the model variants collected in Woodford (2003). They belong to the
family of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.
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We follow a Bayesian econometric strategy to estimate the two models using U.S. quarterly data
during the period 1984:1-2009:3. The estimation results provide a good t to the data since
both models capture most of the business cycle statistics. In the comparison across models, we
nd similar estimates of most structural model parameters, with three main di¤erences. First,
wage stickiness is signicantly higher in the model with unemployment while price stickiness is
nearly the same across models. As a consequence, the introduction of unemployment as excess
supply of labor raises the average length of labor contracts (5.6 quarters with unemployment
and 2.3 quarters without unemployment). Second, the labor supply curve is signicantly more
inelastic in the model with unemployment. Finally, the elasticity of capital adjustment costs is
lower in the model with unemployment.
Our estimated New-Keynesian model reproduces the U.S. business cycle features at least
as well as DSGE models without unemployment and, crucially, it provides a good character-
ization of U.S. unemployment uctuations. In particular, the model captures the volatility,
countercyclicality and persistence of the quarterly U.S. unemployment rate. Furthermore, the
impulse-response functions provide reasonable reactions of unemployment to technology inno-
vations, demand shocks, monetary shocks and cost-push shocks. In the variance-decomposition
analysis, model results indicate that the driving forces of unemployment uctuations are wage
ination shocks, risk premium (demand-side) shocks, and monetary shocks, with little inuence
from technology shocks. Besides, the model provides a good matching of the lead-lag comove-
ment between the unemployment rate and output growth.
Our paper is most closely related to Galí, Smets and Wouters (2011), though developed
independently. There are four important di¤erences across models. First, and most importantly,
in Galí, Smets and Wouters (2011) -following Galí (2011) - unemployment is perfectly correlated
with the average wage markup and therefore moves in tandem with workersmarket power. In
contrast to assuming market power of households, this paper includes an intertemporal equation
to set wages that match labor supply and labor demand. In turn, unemployment is introduced
at a decentralized level that interacts with the price setting behavior. Second, both models
feature a similar number of shocks but Galí, Smets and Wouters (2011) resort to wage and price
markup shocks, whereas we introduce wage and price push shocks. Third, our model provides a
reasonable characterization of the joint dynamics of the labor force, consumption and the wage
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over the business cycle without having to assume away short-run wealth e¤ects on labor as in
Galí, Smets and Wouters (2011). Finally, our estimated model attributes more than 60% of
long-run uctuations in unemployment to demand shocks, while in Galí, Smets and Wouters
(2011) wage markup shocks explain 80% of the uctuations.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model with sticky
wages, unemployment as excess supply of labor and variable capital. Section 3 introduces the
estimation procedure and discusses the estimation results. Section 4 presents the empirical
t of the two models along three important dimensions (second-moment statistics, variance
decomposition and impulse-response functions) and also compares some of the model-implied
dynamic cross-correlations with those in the data. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the
main results.
2 A model with unemployment as excess supply of labor and
variable capital
This section introduces unemployment in a New-Keynesian model with endogenous capital ac-
cumulation. Thus, we borrow most of the elements of the New-Keynesian model described in
Smets and Wouters (2007) except for the labor market and wage setting behavior. On that
dimension, we extend Casares (2010), with the addition of variable capital accumulation, to
incorporate unemployment as excess supply of labor. In contrast to Smets and Wouters (2007),
employment variability is determined only by the extensive margin of labor (number of em-
ployees), assuming that the number of hours per worker is inelastically supplied as in Hansen
(1985).2 Hence, there is a representative household that supplies a variable number of workers
for all di¤erentiated types of labor while each rm demands one specic kind.3 Let us denote
Ldt (i) as the labor demand for jobs in type i rm and Lst (i) as the labor supply of workers in
2This assumption relies on the generally accepted view that most variability of total hours worked in modern
economies is explained by changes in the number of employed people whereas uctuations of the number of hours
at work have signicantly less inuence (Cho and Cooley, 1994; Mulligan, 2001).
3Woodford (2003, chapter 3) uses this labor market scenario for uctuations of the intensive margin of labor
(hours), claiming that the existence of heterogeneous labor services is more adequate for sticky-price models than
the common assumption of an homogeneous labor market.
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period t for that i rm, so that the rate of unemployment at the i rm in period t is
ut (i) = 1  L
d
t (i)
Lst (i)
: (1)
By assumption, wage rigidity causes unemployment uctuations in the model around the (con-
stant) natural rate, un. Thus, if wages were exible they would adjust to make the current rate of
unemployment equal to un. Following Bénassy (1995), and, more recently, Casares (2007, 2010),
labor contracts are revised in that way only if rms and households can get down together to
agree on the natural-rate wage at the rm level. If labor contracts cannot be revised on a given
period, the nominal wage will be automatically adjusted by applying an ad-hoc indexation rule.
Introducing wage stickiness à la Calvo (1983), the nominal wage for labor contracts in rm i is
set at the value that results from the intertemporal equilibrium condition:
E
w
t
1P
j=0

j
jwut+j(i) =
un
1 w
; (2)
where  is the discount rate that incorporates detrending from long-run growth, w is the Calvo
(1983)-type constant probability of not experiencing a labor contract revision, and Ewt is the
rational expectations operator conditional on the lack of revisions in the future. With fully-
exible wages (w = 0:0), (2) yields ut(i) = u
n.
Plugging (1) and the corresponding expressions for future periods in (2) and taking a loglinear
approximation give the following expression
E
w
t
1P
j=0

j
jw

lst+j(i)  ldt+j(i)

= 0; (3)
where lst+j(i) and l
d
t+j(i) represent the log deviations, in any t+ j period, from their respective
steady-state levels of the labor supply of workers and the labor demand for jobs of type i labor.4
In the absence of wage stickiness (w = 0:0), the wage setting condition (3) would bring a perfect
matching between uctuations of labor supply and labor demand at rm level, lst (i) = l
d
t (i). Put
di¤erently, wage rigidities bring about gaps between the amounts of supply of labor (workers
provided by the household) and the demand for labor (jobs demanded by the rm) that make
the e¤ective rate of unemployment deviate from a constant natural rate of unemployment.
Hence, the value of the wage agreed upon labor contract revision depends on how labor
supply and labor demand enter (3). Adapting the household optimizing program of Smets
4Throughout the paper, lower-case variables denote log deviations with respect to steady-state levels.
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and Wouters (2007), the rst order condition on type i labor supply implies drives a positive
reaction to both the rm-specic wage and relative unemployment rate:5
lst (i) =
1
l

logWt(i)  pt   11 un (ut(i)  un)  1(1 =) (ct   (=) ct 1)

:
Loglinearizing and aggregating across all types of labor services yields the relative labor supply
lst (i)  lst = 1l
fWt(i)  11 un (ut(i)  ut) ; (4)
where lst =
R 1
0 l
s
t (i)di is the log deviation of aggregate labor supply from the steady-state level,fWt(i) = logWt(i)   logWt is the relative nominal wage, and ut is the aggregate rate of unem-
ployment dened as 1.0 minus the ratio between aggregate labor demand (e¤ective employment,
Lt)6 and aggregate labor supply (labor force, Lst )
ut = 1  Lt
Lst
:
In semi-loglinear terms, rm-level and aggregate rates of unemployment become
ut(i) = u
n + (1  un)

lst (i)  ldt (i)

: (5a)
ut = u
n + (1  un) (lst   lt) : (5b)
Substituting both (5a) and (5b) in (4) yields
lst (i)  lst = 1l
fWt(i)  lst (i)  ldt (i)  lst + lt : (6)
Regarding rm-level labor demand, we also borrow the production technology and factor markets
used in Smets and Wouters (2007) to derive the optimality condition that makes the ratio of
marginal products (capital and labor) equal to the ratio of factor prices (real wage and rental
rate)
1  

Kdt (i)
Ldt (i)
=
Wt(i)
Pt
rkt
, (7)
where  is the capital share in the Cobb-Douglas production technology, Kdt (i) and L
d
t (i) are the
levels of capital and labor demanded by rm i, the aggregate price level is Pt and rkt is the real
5See the technical appendix -section 1- for the optimizing program of the representative household and the
derivation of the rst order conditions.
6The e¤ective amount of employment is demand determined, as usually assumed in Keynesian models and
many macroeconomics textbooks (e.g., Abel, Bernanke, and Croushore, 2011; Blanchard, 2011).
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rental rate on capital goods. Also as in Smets and Wouters (2007), the loglinearized production
function, with AR(1) technology shocks "at , is
yt(i) = (1  ) ldt (i) + kdt (i) + "at : (8)
Taking away kdt (i) using (8), and inserting the log-linear relationship between demand-determined
relative output and the relative price, eyt(i) =   ePt(i) results in the relative labor demand equa-
tion7
ldt (i)  lt =   ePt(i)  fWt(i); (9)
which introduces the relative price ePt(i) = logPt(i)   logPt and lt as the log deviation from
steady state of demand-determined employment obtained from the aggregation of log deviations
on rm-specic labor demand
lt =
Z 1
0
ldt (i)di: (10)
Equation (3) governs wage setting with the intertemporal targeting of lst+j(i)  ldt+j(i). Recalling
labor supply and labor demand schedules (equations 6 and 9, respectively) for any t+ j period,
lst+j(i) ldt+j(i) = 1l
fWt+j(i)  lst+j(i)  ldt+j(i)  lst+j + lt+j+lst+j lt+j+ ePt+j(i)+fWt+j(i);
which can be simplied as follows
lst+j(i)  ldt+j(i) = 
 1
l +
1+ 1l
fWt+j(i) + 1+ 1l ePt+j(i) +  lst+j   lt+j :
Using the last expression and (5b) in (3) yields
E
w
t
1P
j=0

j
jw

 1l +
(1+1=l)
fWt+j(i) + (1  un) 1 (ut+j   un) + 1+1=l ePt+j(i)

= 0: (11)
For non-revised labor contracts, the nominal wage is automatically adjusted by applying an
indexation rule that combines a weight 0 < w < 1 for lagged ination and the complementary
weight 1  w for the steady-state ination rate plus a stochastic wage-push shock "wt
Wt(j) =Wt 1(j)

(1 + t 1)w(1 +  + "wt )
1 w : (12)
This indexation rule is very similar to the one assumed in Smets and Wouters (2007), with the
only di¤erence that we include the wage indexation shock "wt to replace wage mark-up shocks
of their model.
7See technical appendix 1 -section 1- for further details.
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Let fW t (i) = logW t (i)   logWt be the log di¤erence between the wage set in the rm i,
W t (i), if receiving a Calvo-type signal allowing to apply (3) and the aggregate wage, Wt. Then,
dening wage ination as wt = logWt   logWt 1, the relative wage consistent with (11) and
(12) is8
fW t (i) =  (1 w) 1l + Ewt 1Pj=0jjw

1+1=l
1 un (ut+j   un) +  ePt+j(i)
 Et
1P
j=1

j
jw
 
wt+j 1 + (1  w) "wt+k   wt+j

; (13)
Equation (13) shows that the value of the nominal wage newly set at the rm depends negatively
on the stream of the economy-wide rate of unemployment and also negatively on the stream of
relative prices. As in Casares (2010), let us introduce the following guess: relative optimal
pricing and relative wage setting are related as follows
eP t (i) = eP t + 1fWt 1(i); (14a)fW t (i) = fW t   2 ePt(i); (14b)
where eP t (i) = logP t (i)  logPt is the rm-specic relative optimal price, eP t = R 10 logP t (i)di 
logPt is the aggregate relative optimal price, fW t = R 10 logW t (i)di   logWt is the aggregate
relative labor-clearing wage, and 1 and 2 are coe¢ cients to be determined by equilibrium con-
ditions. Using rm-specic relationships (14a)-(14b), and going through some algebra, equation
(13) can be rewritten in the following way9
(1 + )fW t (i) =   (1 w)( 1l +)(1 wp) ePt(i)  (1 w)(1+1=l)( 1l +)(1 un) Et 1Pj=0jjw (ut+j   un) (15)
+(1 + )Et
1P
j=1

j
jw
 
wt+j   wt+j 1   (1  w) "wt+j

;
with  = 1w
 1l +

1  p(1 w)
1 wp

. Equation (15) proves right the proposed linear relation (14b),
with the following solution for 2
2 =
(1 w)
( 1l +)(1 wp)(1+)
;
8 It should be noticed that
E
w
t
1P
j=0

j
jw
fWt+j(i) =
E
w
t
1P
j=0

j
jw
fW t (i) + jP
k=1
(wt+k 1 + (1  w) "wt+k   wt+k)

:
9The proof is shown in the technical appendix -section 2-.
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and the following expression for the aggregate relative wage set in period t
fW t =   (1 w)(1+1=l)( 1l +)(1 un)(1+)Et 1Pj=0jjw (ut+j   un)+Et 1Pj=1jjw  wt+j   wt+j 1   (1  w) "wt+j :
(16)
Calvo-type wage stickiness and the wage indexation rule (10) imply a proportional relationship
between relative wages and the rate of wage ination adjusted by the indexation factors
fW t = w1 w (wt   wt 1   (1  w) "wt ) : (17)
Combining (16) and (17) yields
wt = wt 1 + (1  w)"wt   (
1 w)(1 w)(1+1=l)
w(
 1
l +)(1 un)(1+)
Et
1P
j=0

j
jw (ut+j   un)
+1 ww Et
1P
j=1

j
jw
 
wt+j   wt+j 1   (1  w)"wt+j

:
Thus, wt   wEtwt+1 can be expressed as
wt   wEtwt+1 = wt 1   wwt + (1  w)"wt   w(1  w)Et"wt+1
  (1 w)(1 w)(1+1=l)
w(
 1
l +)(1 un)(1+)
(ut   un) + 1 ww wEt
 
wt+1   wt   (1  w)"wt+1

;
which collapses to the wage ination equation
wt = Et
w
t+1+wt 1 wt  (
1 w)(1 w)(1+1=l)
w(
 1
l +)(1 un)(1+)
(ut   un)+(1 w)
 
"wt   Et"wt+1

; (18)
Thus, wage ination dynamics are inversely related to the rate of unemployment.10 For the real
wage equation, we can take the log di¤erence to its denition, wt = log

Wt
Pt

, to obtain
wt   wt 1 = wt   t: (19)
Using (18) in (19) and solving out for the log of the real wage leads to
wt = w1wt 1+(1  w1) (Etwt+1 + Ett+1) w2t+w3t 1 w4 (ut   un)+w5
 
"wt   Et"wt+1

;
(20)
where w1 = 11+ , w2 =
1+w
1+
; w3 =
w
1+
; w4 =
1
1+
(1 w)(1 w)(1+1=l)
w(
 1
l +)(1 un)(1+)
, and w5 = 1 w1+ .
10The slope coe¢ cient in the wage ination equation (18) is di¤erent from the one found in Casares (2010)
due to the presence of variable capital and a competitive rental market together with a constant natural rate of
unemployment.
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Let us turn now to derive the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. The presence of unemployment
as excess supply of labor is going to inuence ination dynamics through the e¤ect of rm-
specic wage setting on rm-specic real marginal costs. For its derivation, we start from the
loglinearized equation for the optimal price in Smets and Wouters (2007):11
pt (i) =
 
1  p

E
p
t
1P
j=0

j
jp
 
A

mct+j(i) + 
p
t+j

+ pt+j   p
jP
k=1
t+k 1
!
; (21)
where pt (i) is the log of the optimal price set by rm i, A > 0 is a constant parameter that
depends upon the Kimball (1995) goods market aggregator and the steady-state price mark-
up,12 and E
p
t is the rational expectations operator conditional on the lack of optimal pricing
after period t. The log of the optimal price depends on the expectation of three factors: the
log of the real marginal costs, mct+j(i), exogenous price mark-up variations, 
p
t+j , and the
log of the aggregate price level adjusted by the indexation rule, pt+j   p
Pj
k=1 t+k 1. Since
pt+j = pt +
Pj
k=1 
p
t+k, the following optimal relative price (
eP t (i) = pt (i)  pt) obtains:
eP t (i) = A  1  pEpt 1P
j=0

j
jp

mct+j(i) + 
p
t+j

+ Et
1P
j=1

j
jp (t+j   pt+j 1) : (22)
Unlike Smets and Wouters (2007), the real marginal cost is rm-specic in our model as a
consequence of rm-specic nominal wages. Taking logs in the denition of the rm-specic real
marginal cost gives13
mct(i) = (1  ) (logWt(i)  pt) +  log rkt   zt; (23)
where zt is the log of capital utilization. Summing up across all rms and subtracting the result
from (23) leads to
mct(i) = mct + (1  )fWt(i): (24)
Generalizing (24) for t+ j periods and inserting the resulting expressions in (22) yields
eP t (i) = A  1  pEpt 1P
j=0

j
jp

mct+j + (1  )fWt+j(i) + pt+j+AEt 1P
j=1

j
jp

t+j   ppt+j 1

:
(25)
11This result is provided in the technical appendix of Smets and Wouters (2007), available at
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june07/20041254_app.pdf .
12Concretely, A = 1=((  1)"p+1) where "p is the curvature of the Kimball aggregator and  is the steady-state
price mark-up.
13The real marginal cost of rm i in period t is MCt(i) =

Wt(i)
Pt
1 
(Rkt )

Zt(1 )1  .
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Recalling the rm-specic relationships (14a) and (14b), and doing some algebra, equation (25)
can be written as follows14
(1 + ) eP t (i) = A(1 )(1 p)w1 wp fWt 1(i) +A  1  pEt 1Pj=0jjp

mct+j + 
p
t+j

(26)
+(1 + )Et
1P
j=1

j
jp (t+j   pt+j 1) ;
where  = 2A(1  )

1  (1 p)w
1 pw

. Equation (26) validates (14a) with 1 given by
1 =
A(1 )(1 p)w
(1 pw)(1+)
; (27)
and also determines the dynamics of the aggregate relative prices across all rms that were able
to optimally set prices in period t
eP t = A(1 p)1+ Et 1P
j=0

j
jp

mct+j + 
p
t+j

+ Et
1P
j=1

j
jp (t+j   pt+j 1) : (28)
Calvo pricing combined with the same price indexation rule as in Smets and Wouters (2007)
determine, after loglinearization, that relative optimal prices and the rate of ination are related
as follows eP t = p1 p (t   pt 1) ;
which can be substituted into the left-hand side of (28) to obtain
t = pt 1 +
A(1 p)(1 p)
p(1+)
Et
1P
j=0

j
jp

mct+j + 
p
t+j

+
1 p
p
Et
1P
j=1

j
jp (t+j   pt+j 1) :
(29)
Rewriting (29) one period ahead to compute pEtt+1 and then subtracting it from (29) results
in
t   pEtt+1 = pt 1   pppt +
A(1 p)(1 p)
p(1+)
(mct + 
p
t ) +
1 p
p
pEt (t+1   pt) :
Finally, we can put together terms on current and expected next periods ination, re-scale the
mark-up shock at "pt = 3
p
t and -following the Smets and Wouters (2007) convention- introduce
pt as the log deviation of the price mark-up (mct =  pt ), so that the ination equation becomes
t = 1t 1 + 2Ett+1   3pt + "pt ; (30)
14The algebra involved is provided in the technical appendix -section 3-.
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where 1 =
p
1+p
, 2 =

1+p
, 3 = 11+p
(1 p)(1 p)
p((p 1)"p+1)(1+)
. Interestingly, the ination
equation (30) is a hybrid New-Keynesian Phillips curve where the slope coe¢ cient is a¤ected
by the presence of nominal rigidities on both the goods and labor market. Thus, the slope of
(30) depends on the value of the sticky-wage probability, w, that is contained in , reecting
the complementarities between pricing and wage setting assumed in (14a) and (14b) that are
absent in standard DSGE models.15 More precisely, the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (30) is
atter than the one derived in Smets and Wouters (2007) which had a slope coe¢ cient SW3 =
1
1+p
(1 p)(1 p)
p((p 1)"p+1)
= 3 (1 + ). Intuitively, the response of ination to an increase in the real
marginal cost is weaker in our model because relative wages will move downwards due to higher
relative prices as indicated by equation (14b). Therefore, a more moderate initial increase in
prices set by rms will be enough to maximize intertemporal prot as they anticipate lower
marginal costs when nominal wages are reset.
Hence, equations (20) and (30) collect the e¤ects of unemployment as excess supply of labor
in the dynamics of the real wage and ination. The demand-side equations, the monetary
policy rule and all the stochastic elements of the model (except for the wage indexation shock)
are borrowed from Smets and Wouters (2007) since all these equations can be reached with no
inuence of the wage setting behavior and unemployment uctuations. Thus, the shock processes
are: the AR(1) technology shock "at = a"
a
t 1 + at , the AR(1) risk premium disturbance that
shifts the demand for purchases of consumption and investment goods "bt = b"
b
t 1 + bt , the
exogenous spending shock driven by an AR(1) process with an extra term capturing the potential
inuence of technology innovations on exogenous spending "gt = g"
g
t 1 + 
g
t + ga
a
t , the AR(1)
investment shock "it = i"
i
t 1 + it, the AR(1) monetary policy shock: "Rt = R"Rt 1 + Rt , the
ARMA(1,1) price mark-up shock: "pt = p"
p
t 1 + 
p
t   ppt 1, and the ARMA(1,1) wage shock
"wt = w"
w
t 1 + wt   wwt 1. The technical appendix -sections 4 and 5- displays the complete
set of equations of the model and discusses the equation-to-equation comparison across models.
From now on, we will refer to the model with unemployment as the CMV model while the model
of Smets and Wouters (2007) will be the SW model, taking the initial letters of the authorslast
15The slope coe¢ cient of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (30) is also analytically di¤erent from the one
obtained in the model of Casares (2010) which features unemployment as excess supply of labor and constant
capital.
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names.
3 Estimation
We estimate both models with U.S. data from the rst quarter of 1984 to the third quarter of
2009. Except for some of the last quarters of the sample, corresponding to the 2007-08 nancial
crises, this period is characterized by mild uctuations (the so-called Great Moderation) of
aggregate variables (see Stock and Watson, 2002, among others). Thus, the estimation exercises
do not su¤er from some potential miss-specication sources, such as parameter instability in
both the private sector -for instance, Calvo probabilities (Moreno, 2004)- and the monetary
policy reactions to ination or output. Indeed, some authors argue that a sound monetary
policy implementation is the main factor behind the low business cycle volatility in this period
(Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999).
Regarding the data set, we take as observable variables quarterly time series of the ination
rate, the Federal funds rate, civilian employment and the log di¤erences of the real Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP), real consumption, real investment, and the real wage.16 Thus, variables
displaying a long-run trend enter the estimation procedure in log di¤erences to extract their sta-
tionary business cycle component.17 In the estimation of the CMV model, we add the quarterly
unemployment rate as another observable variable and ignore the log of employment in order
to consider the same (number of) shocks in the two models. The data were retrieved from the
Federal Reserve of St. Louis (FRED2) database.
The estimation procedure also follows Smets and Wouters (2007). Thus, we consider a two-
step Bayesian procedure. In the rst step, the log posterior function is maximized in a way that
combines the prior information of the parameters with the empirical likelihood of the data. In a
second step, we perform the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to compute the posterior distribution
16The rate of ination is obtained as the rst di¤erence of (the log of) the implicit GDP deator, whereas the
real wage is computed as the ratio between nominal compensation per hour and the GDP price deator. Smets
and Wouters (2007) estimate their model with (the log of) hours. As an alternative, and in order to facilitate a
comparison with the estimation results of the CMV model, this paper estimates a version of the SW model where
employment variability is determined only by the extensive margin of labor. Thus, we estimate the SW model
using (the log of) civilian employment.
17 In this way, we avoid the well-known measurement error implied by standard ltering treatments.
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of the parameter set.18 It should be noted that in the estimation of the CMV model, the slope
coe¢ cients in the ination and real wage equations were introduced as implicit functions of the
undetermined coe¢ cients 1 and 2. These coe¢ cients can be analytically solved through a
non-linear two-equation system. We choose the positive values associated with these solutions,
as implied by theory.
In terms of the priors, we select the same prior distributions as Smets and Wouters (2007) for
the estimation of the two models (see the rst three columns in Tables 1A and 1B), and we also
borrow their notation for the structural parameters. In the CMV model we have two additional
parameters: the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution across goods, , and the steady-state
unemployment rate, u. Prior mean of these two parameters is set at 6:0, in line with previous
studies.
Tables 1A and 1B show the estimation results of both the SW and CMV models and re-
port the posterior mean estimates together with the 5% and 95% quantiles of the posterior
distribution.
[Insert Table 1A and Table 1B here]
As the last three columns of Tables 1A and 1B show, our version of the SW model -with
a ve-year longer sample period- conrms their estimates of the structural parameters. Across
models, there are three main di¤erences. First, the labor supply is less elastic in the CMV
model, where l is 4:79, while it is 2:43 in the SW model. Second, the Calvo probability of
wage stickiness is higher in the CMV model, where w is 0:82, while it is 0:57 in the SW model.
Therefore, the introduction of unemployment as excess supply of labor increases the estimated
average length of labor contracts from (1   0:56) 1 = 2:27 quarters to (1   0:82) 1 = 5:56
quarters. Third, the elasticity of capital adjustment costs is higher in the SW model, where '
is 4:51, while it is 3:35 in the CMV model.
In both models, the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (c) is quite low,
slightly below 1.0, and the presence of habit persistence is signicant and moderate, as h is in
the vicinity of 0:5. The Calvo probability of price stickiness (p) is high, around 0:76, and also
18All estimation exercises are performed with DYNARE free routine software, which can be downloaded from
http://www.dynare.org. A sample of 250,000 draws was used (ignoring the rst 20% of draws). A step size of 0.3
resulted in an average acceptation rate of roughly 30% across the ve Metropolis-Hastings blocks used.
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very similar across models. Both wage and price indexation parameters (w and p, respectively)
are slightly higher in the SW model. Even though price rigidities and indexation parameters
are similar in both models, the New-Keynesian Phillips curve is atter in the CMV model (see
discussion in Section 2). Concretely, the estimated slopes are 3 = 0:0055 in the CMV model,
lower than SW3 = 0:0083 in the SW model as a consequence of an estimated  = 0:4037.
Meanwhile, the elasticity of capital utilization adjustment cost  is 0:82 in the CMV model
and somewhat lower at 0:68 in the SW model. Monetary policy parameters are similar across
models, with a stabilizing interest reaction of ination, r, between 1:75 and 1:93, a response to
output gap growth, ry, between 0:20 and 0:23, and a high policy rule persistence parameter, ,
between 0:82 and 0:84. The only noticeable di¤erence is that the response to the output gap, ry,
is not signicantly di¤erent from zero in the SW model, whereas it is small, 0:14, but signicant
in the CMV model. The estimate of one plus the xed-cost share, , is slightly higher in the
CMV model. The estimates of the steady-state parameter that determines the long-run rate of
growth, , the real interest rate, 100( 1   1), and the rate of ination, , are similar in the
two models, as well as the estimate of the capital share in the production function, . Finally,
the elasticity of substitution across goods, , and the steady state rate of unemployment, u, are
only estimated in the CMV model, and are in line with the values chosen as priors.
Table 1B shows the standard deviations and autocorrelations of the seven structural shocks.
The estimates of the standard deviations of the innovations look similar in both models. The only
di¤erence lies in the volatility of the wage-push innovation, which is signicantly higher in the
CMV model. As shown in the technical appendix, this is due to the fact that the wage ination
equation di¤ers across models and the wage-push shock also has a di¤erent interpretation; it is a
wage indexation shock in the CMV model while it is a wage mark-up shock in the SW model.19
Again, the estimates of persistence and moving-average parameters are similar across models.
The only di¤erence lies in the persistence parameter associated with the wage-push shock, which
is lower in the CMV model. Moreover, the monetary policy shock is the one exhibiting the
lowest rst-order autocorrelation -around 0:30- in both models. Technology, risk premium and
19Moreover, the wage-push shock in the real wage equation of the CMV model appears multiplied by the
coe¢ cient w5, which is estimated to be close to 0:32 while it is a unit coe¢ cient in the real wage equation of the
SW model. As a result, the e¤ective size of the wage-push shock is similar across models.
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exogenous spending innovations are highly persistent across models. The remaining shocks show
less persistence in the SW model.
4 Empirical Fit
This section compares the performance of the SW and CMV models along three dimensions
in the rst three subsections. First, we analyze the ability of the two models to reproduce
second-moment statistics found in U.S. quarterly data. Second, we study the contribution of
each structural shock in explaining the total variance decomposition of macroeconomic variables.
Third, we carry out an impulse-response analysis. Finally, the fourth subsection analyzes the
ability of the CMV model to replicate U.S. lead-lag comovements between the unemployment
rate and the output growth rate and between the rate of ination and the output growth rate.
4.1 Second-moment statistics
Table 2 shows second-moment statistics obtained from actual data, and the ones found in the
estimated CMV and SW models.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In general, the two models do a good job in reproducing the cyclical features of the data.
Thus, both models match quite well the historical volatility of output growth, consumption
growth, investment growth, the real wage growth, the log of civilian employment, price ination,
and the nominal interest rate. The CMV model matches all these volatilities better except for
the nominal interest rate. Importantly, the introduction of unemployment as excess supply of
labor in the estimated CMV model reproduces the unemployment rate volatility very accurately.
Moreover, the CMV model by introducing unemployment is able to distinguish employment from
the labor force (i.e. labor supply). Thus, the CMV model is able to reproduce rather well labor
force volatility.
The contemporaneous correlations between each variable and the output growth rate are also
reported in Table 2 as a measure of their procyclical or countercyclical behavior. Both models
provide the sign found in the data for these correlations except for the ones of the real wage
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growth and the nominal interest rate. In general, most of the model implied contemporaneous
correlations are close to their data counterparts. Finally, the two models do a reasonable job
in replicating the rst-order autocorrelation of all variables, with the exception of an excessive
ination persistence in the SW model. Interestingly, our model does a good job in reproducing
labor market dynamics without resorting to the device of considering an arbitrarily small short-
term wealth e¤ect introduced in Galí, Smets and Wouters (2011).
4.2 Variance decomposition
Table 3 shows the total variance decomposition analysis for the CMV and SW models. In the
CMV model, technology innovations a explain nearly 40% of the uctuations in labor force
and output and consumption growth. Meanwhile, demand (risk-premium) shocks, b, drive
around 75% of the variability of the nominal interest rate and more than one third of both
employment and the rate of unemployment. The inuence of exogenous spending (scal/net
exports) shocks, g, is rather low as it determines 14% of output growth and even lower shares of
the other variables.20 Innovations in the investment adjustment costs, i, only have a substantial
impact on investment uctuations (73%) whereas monetary policy shocks, R, explain between
15% and 21% of uctuations of output growth, consumption growth, employment and the rate
of unemployment. Meanwhile, ination (price-push) shocks, p, are the main determinant of
ination variability (56%) but account for less than 10% of the variance share of the other
variables. The wage-push (indexation) shock, w, exerts a strong inuence on the real wage
growth (81%) and more moderate inuence on the rate of unemployment (33%), labor force
(21%) and ination (14%), while having a weak impact on the rest of the variables.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Therefore, the introduction of unemployment as excess supply of labor in an estimated
New-Keynesian model implies that the main driving forces behind U.S. unemployment uctua-
tions are wage-push shocks (33%), demand shifts driven by risk-premium variations (35%) and
20As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the role of the exogenous spending shock is to bring demand-determined
changes in output that are not collected by either private consumption or private investment, such as scal shocks
or exports/imports variations.
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also monetary policy shocks (21%). Innovations in technology barely explain 2% of unemploy-
ment variability. By contrast, the dynamics of output growth are substantially inuenced by
technology shocks (39%), as well as a mix of demand-side perturbations (risk-premium shocks,
exogenous spending innovations and monetary policy shocks that jointly take 59% in its variance
decomposition).
The SW model estimated here conrms that technology innovations, a, are less inuential
on business cycle uctuations than in the CMV model, a¤ecting 21% of output changes and lower
percentages of the rest of the variables. The risk-premium shocks, b, account for approximately
one fourth of the variability of output growth and ination, similarly to the CMV model, while
their inuence on the movements of the nominal interest rate is still high at 71% of total
variability. As in the CMV model, the inuence of exogenous spending shocks, g, is not
substantial with only 14% of uctuations of output growth, while the investment shock, i,
mainly a¤ects private investment (72% of its variability) and has a minor inuence on the
remaining variables. Monetary policy shocks, R, account for 15% and 22% for changes in output
and consumption, respectively; whereas ination shocks, p, only explain signicant fractions of
variability of ination (29%) and the changes in the real wage (18%). Wage-push shocks are more
inuential in the SW model than in the CMV model as they explain 63% of variations in the real
wage growth, but in addition they also determine a high share of employment uctuations (81%),
30% of ination variability, 24% of consumption growth uctuations, and 14% of variability on
both nominal interest rate and output growth.21
It is worthwhile highlighting that the results for long-run variance decompositions obtained
from the estimated CMV model present some relevant di¤erences with respect to those in Galí,
Smets and Wouters (2007). Most importantly, our model gives a relatively large importance to
demand (risk premium, monetary policy and scal/net export) shocks in explaining most cyclical
uctuations, whereas in their case wage markup shocks emerge as a key driving force behind
many variables. In particular, results in terms of unemployment dynamics are in stark contrast,
as they attribute them almost entirely to wage markup shocks, whereas in our case demand
shocks account for more than half of the variance. Despite these di¤erences, both models confer
21This result will be reected in the relatively large reactions of these variables to the estimated wage-push
shock displayed in the impulse-response analysis conducted below.
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a large importance to productivity shocks in explaining output uctuations.
4.3 Impulse-response functions
Figures 1, 2 and 3 plot the impulse response functions obtained in the SW and CMV estimated
models to the seven -one standard deviation- structural shocks. Across gures, we observe
that the responses are quite similar for both models in terms of sign and dynamics. However,
the CMV model shows greater responses to technology shocks and weaker to wage-push and
price-push shocks, than in the SW model. In particular, Figure 1 shows that the technology
shock increases output, consumption and investment, with the e¤ects being higher and more
persistent in the CMV model. The risk premium shock results in similar declines of these three
variables, whereas the investment shock increases output and investment at the expense of a
drop in consumption due to the consequent monetary policy tightening -see Figure 3 below-.
The scal-net exports (exogenous spending) shock increases output but crowds out investment
and consumption in both models, whereas the interest rate shock has a negative impact on
these three variables, as typical from sticky-price models. Models disagree substantially in the
e¤ects of the wage-push shocks. These di¤erent e¤ects do not come as a surprise since the
interpretation of this shock in the two models, as explained above, is di¤erent. Thus, the CMV
model provides a slight decrease in output while in the SW model we nd a much depeer and
more persistent fall in output. Price mark-up shocks are also more contractionary on output,
consumption and investment in the SW model, through the implied increase in interest rates in
response to higher ination.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
[Insert Figure 2 here]
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Figure 2 shows the responses of the labor market variables to the structural shocks. While
both the SW and CMV models include log uctuations of the real wage and labor (employment),
the CMV model captures the response of the unemployment rate as well, in contrast to the SW
model. The real wage rises after technology, investment, scal-net exports and wage-push shocks,
whereas it decreases after risk premium, monetary policy and price-push shocks. Meanwhile,
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employment falls countercyclically in both models when there is a positive technology shock.
This is a characteristic response in New-Keynesian models with sticky prices, as discussed in
Galí (1999). By contrast, procyclical reactions of employment are always reported after demand-
side disturbances such as risk-premium shocks, investment shocks, and scal-net exports shocks.
Both models imply declines of employment in reaction to price and wage cost-push shocks.
However, the fall of employment after a wage-push shock is much deeper and persistent in
the SW model than in the CMV model (see Figure 2), which is consistent with the variance
decomposition analysis conducted above.22
The reactions of unemployment only reported in the CMV modelare closely and inversely
related to those of employment, as the inuence of labor supply variability is small due to the
low estimated labor supply elasticity.23 A positive technology shock increases unemployment
only during the quarter of the shock. Demand shocks (risk premium, investment, scal-net
exports and monetary policy) bring procylical reactions of unemployment, that display quite
persistent dynamic patterns. The unemployment rate also raises after both wage and price
cost-push shocks, since monetary policy reacts through higher interest rates to these supply-side
disturbances.
Figure 3 shows the responses of the nominal interest rate and ination. The plots are
rather similar across models, although the reactions in the SW model show more amplitude
after wage-push shocks. Technology innovations bring countercylical cuts of ination and the
nominal interest rate whereas three of the demand shocks (risk premium, investment, and scal-
net exports) result in procyclical responses of ination and interest rates. The interest rate
shock represents an unexpected monetary policy tightening that brings a realistic U-shaped
decline in ination (as observed in Romer and Romer, 2004). Finally, both wage and price push
22This higher sensitivity to wage-push shocks in the SW model is the result of its particular labor market
assumptions. Households must attend rm-specic relative labor demand as constraints in their optimizing
programs. In turn, those households that apply the indexation rule with the positive wage shock will su¤er from
a signicant employment cut. This implies contractionary e¤ects on consumption due to the non-separability
between labor and consumption in the utility function, which justies the di¤erence in the response of output
growth across models (see Figure 1).
23 In log uctations from steady-state, labor supply (labor force) can be obtained as the sum of the response of
labor plus the response of the rate of unemployment.
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shocks increase ination and, as a result, trigger a gradual and persistent increase in the nominal
interest rate.
4.4 Dynamic Cross-Correlation Functions
This section studies the ability of the CMV model to reproduce two important comovement
patterns observed in U.S. business cycles. First, we examine the dynamic correlations between
the rate of unemployment and the output growth rate in a model-to-data comparison (Figure 4).
Then, we assess the capacity of the model to replicate the dynamic cross correlations between
ination and output growth rates (Figure 5). These gures compare the lead-lag correlation
functions in the data with those implied by the CMV model. They also show the  two-
standard deviation condence interval (CI) bands derived from simulated data obtained from
5,000 independent draws for the seven innovations of the CMV model.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Figure 4 shows the lead and lag correlation structure between output growth and the rate of
unemployment observed in actual U.S. data (dashed line) and the corresponding comovement
implied by the CMV model (solid line) within the model-implied statistical condence interval.
The estimated model reproduces the negative contemporaneous comovement between the U.S.
rates of unemployment and output growth. In addition, the model replicates the positive cor-
relation between lagged rates of unemployment and current output growth rate (i.e., cases with
j < 0 in Figure 4) and the negative correlation between future unemployment rates and current
output growth rate (i.e., cases with j > 0 in Figure 4).
Similarly, Figure 5 compares the dynamic comovement patterns between ination and output
growth found in US data (dashed line) with those implied by the CMV model (solid line). Once
again the estimated model does a good job in reproducing the lead-lag pattern shape displayed
by actual data.24 Thus, the model reproduces two stylized facts. First, higher lagged ination
anticipates a lower current output growth rate (i.e. for j < 0). Second, higher current output
growth anticipates higher future ination 1-4 quarters ahead.
24Smets and Wouters (2007) also report a good matching to dynamic cross correlations between ination and
Hodrick-Prescott ltered output in their model without unemployment.
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5 Conclusions
This paper introduces a model with both sticky prices and sticky wages that combines elements
of Smets and Wouters (2007) and Casares (2010) in a way that incorporates unemployment as
excess supply of labor in a medium-scale New-Keynesian model. The alternative labor market
assumptions have implications for the real wage equation (where the real wage is inversely related
to the rate of unemployment) and also for the New Keynesian Phillips curve (where the slope
coe¢ cient is lower and it depends upon the level of wage stickiness).
The structural model parameters were estimated with Bayesian techniques and then com-
pared to the estimates of the benchmark New-Keynesian model of Smets and Wouters (2007).
Most parameter estimates are quite similar across models. The only substantial di¤erences are
that in the model with unemployment the labor supply curve is less elastic, wages are stickier
with a longer average in the length of labor contracts, and the elasticity of capital adjustment
costs is lower. The empirical comparison also shows that the two models do a similar job in re-
producing many of the features characterizing the recent U.S. business cycles. Importantly, our
model with unemployment is able to explain the most salient features -volatility, cyclical correla-
tion and persistence- characterizing U.S. unemployment rate uctuations. The impulse-response
functions show that the rate of unemployment reacts in a countercyclical way to demand shocks
and price-push shocks, whereas the response is initially procyclical and later countercyclical after
productivity innovations and clearly procyclical after wage-push innovations.
Our results also indicate that uctuations in the unemployment rate are mostly driven by
wage-push shocks and by demand-side shocks such as risk-premium disturbances and monetary
policy shocks, while technology shocks play a more secondary role. Regarding output growth
variability, changes in output growth are evenly driven by technology innovations (nearly 50%
of total variability) and demand shocks in the model with unemployment. The model without
unemployment gives less inuence to technology shocks and more to cost-push shocks. Finally,
the estimated model with unemployment is able to provide a good match of the U.S. dynamic
cross correlation between unemployment and output growth rates.
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Table 1A. Priors and estimated posteriors of the structural parameters
Priors Posteriors
CMV model SW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
' Normal 4:00 1:50 3:35 1:60 4:97 4:51 2:80 6:12
h Beta 0:70 0:10 0:46 0:32 0:59 0:57 0:47 0:69
c Normal 1:50 0:37 0:97 0:67 1:30 0:82 0:56 1:05
l Normal 2:00 0:75 4:79 3:92 5:61 2:43 1:47 3:36
p Beta 0:50 0:10 0:77 0:71 0:83 0:76 0:67 0:83
w Beta 0:50 0:10 0:82 0:77 0:87 0:56 0:43 0:70
w Beta 0:50 0:15 0:37 0:17 0:55 0:49 0:25 0:73
p Beta 0:50 0:15 0:30 0:10 0:56 0:45 0:17 0:68
 Beta 0:50 0:15 0:82 0:71 0:94 0:68 0:51 0:86
 Normal 1:25 0:12 1:61 1:44 1:76 1:55 1:42 1:69
r Normal 1:50 0:25 1:75 1:39 2:10 1:93 1:62 2:23
 Beta 0:75 0:10 0:84 0:80 0:88 0:82 0:78 0:86
ry Normal 0:12 0:05 0:14 0:07 0:21 0:02  0:01 0:05
ry Normal 0:12 0:05 0:23 0:18 0:28 0:20 0:15 0:24
 Gamma 0:62 0:10 0:65 0:54 0:77 0:66 0:52 0:79
100( 1 1) Gamma 0:25 0:10 0:23 0:10 0:36 0:23 0:11 0:34
l Normal 0:00 2:00        0:43  2:55 1:81
 Normal 0:40 0:10 0:40 0:32 0:47 0:39 0:36 0:43
 Normal 0:30 0:05 0:14 0:10 0:16 0:11 0:09 0:14
 Normal 6:00 1:50 6:92 4:74 9:36      
u Normal 6:00 2:00 6:28 5:66 6:91      
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Table 1B. Priors and estimated posteriors of the shock processes
Priors Posteriors
CMV model SW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
a Invgamma 0:10 2:00 0:46 0:37 0:54 0:35 0:30 0:39
b Invgamma 0:10 2:00 0:16 0:12 0:20 0:18 0:12 0:24
g Invgamma 0:10 2:00 0:40 0:35 0:45 0:35 0:31 0:39
i Invgamma 0:10 2:00 0:46 0:36 0:55 0:43 0:31 0:54
R Invgamma 0:10 2:00 0:13 0:12 0:15 0:13 0:11 0:15
p Invgamma 0:10 2:00 0:15 0:12 0:17 0:14 0:11 0:16
w Invgamma 0:10 2:00 1:47 0:88 1:95 0:32 0:25 0:38
a Beta 0:50 0:20 0:98 0:97 0:99 0:94 0:91 0:97
b Beta 0:50 0:20 0:92 0:88 0:96 0:90 0:85 0:95
g Beta 0:50 0:20 0:96 0:94 0:99 0:97 0:95 0:99
i Beta 0:50 0:20 0:69 0:56 0:82 0:67 0:51 0:81
R Beta 0:50 0:20 0:28 0:15 0:41 0:31 0:19 0:44
p Beta 0:50 0:20 0:54 0:16 0:82 0:66 0:41 0:94
w Beta 0:50 0:20 0:73 0:52 0:92 0:98 0:96 0:99
p Beta 0:50 0:20 0:50 0:23 0:77 0:57 0:33 0:83
w Beta 0:50 0:20 0:42 0:21 0:63 0:71 0:52 0:92
ga Beta 0:50 0:20 0:29 0:14 0:45 0:63 0:47 0:77
27
Table 2. Second-moment statistics
y c i w l u lforce R 
U.S. data (1984:1-2009:3):
Standard deviation (%) 0:63 0:61 2:26 0:69 2:08 1:17 1:10 0:63 0:26
Correlation with output growth 1:0 0:67 0:70  0:03 0:01  0:07  0:05 0:27  0:05
Autocorrelation 0:35 0:30 0:61 0:05 0:98 0:97 0:98 0:98 0:51
Estimated CMV model:
Standard deviation (%) 0:73 0:69 2:41 0:77 1:42 1:14 0:93 0:48 0:29
Correlation with output growth 1:0 0:68 0:55 0:23 0:08  0:22  0:16  0:06  0:11
Autocorrelation 0:30 0:36 0:62 0:24 0:94 0:94 0:95 0:96 0:62
Estimated SW model:
Standard deviation (%) 0:77 0:70 2:52 0:79 3:30   3:30 0:52 0:46
Correlation with output growth 1:0 0:74 0:57 0:28 0:08   0:08  0:10  0:28
Autocorrelation 0:38 0:49 0:64 0:29 0:99   0:99 0:96 0:82
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Table 3. Long-run variance decomposition25
Estimated CMV model:
Innovations y c i w l u lforce R 
Technology, a 0:39 0:39 0:03 0:02 0:15 0:02 0:41 0:06 0:05
Risk premium, b 0:21 0:26 0:13 0:05 0:36 0:35 0:09 0:75 0:21
Fiscal/Net exports, g 0:15 0:10 0:00 0:00 0:09 0:01 0:18 0:02 0:01
Investment, i 0:08 0:04 0:73 0:01 0:10 0:06 0:06 0:06 0:01
Interest-rate, R 0:15 0:19 0:08 0:03 0:19 0:21 0:03 0:06 0:03
Wage-push, w 0:00 0:01 0:01 0:81 0:06 0:33 0:21 0:04 0:14
Price-push, p 0:02 0:02 0:02 0:09 0:05 0:02 0:03 0:02 0:56
Estimated SW model:
Innovations y c i w l u lforce R 
Technology, a 0:21 0:06 0:02 0:01 0:01   0:01 0:03 0:01
Risk premium, b 0:23 0:34 0:09 0:11 0:06   0:06 0:71 0:30
Fiscal/Net exports, g 0:14 0:04 0:00 0:00 0:04   0:04 0:01 0:00
Investment, i 0:06 0:02 0:72 0:01 0:02   0:02 0:03 0:01
Interest-rate, R 0:15 0:22 0:05 0:06 0:03   0:03 0:05 0:08
Wage-push, w 0:14 0:24 0:07 0:63 0:81   0:81 0:14 0:30
Price-push, p 0:08 0:08 0:06 0:18 0:04   0:04 0:04 0:29
25For a 100-period ahead forecast.
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Figure 1: Impulse response functions of output, consumption, and investment. CMV model
(thick line) and SW model (thin line).
30
Figure 2: Impulse responses of the real wage, labor, and the rate of unemployment. CMV model
(thick line) and SW model (thin line).
31
Figure 3: Impulse response functions of the nominal interest rate and the rate of ination. CMV
model (thick line) and SW model (thin line).
32
Figure 4: Dynamic cross-correlation between output growth, yt, and the unemployment rate,
ut+j .
33
Figure 5: Dynamic cross-correlation between output growth, yt, and ination, t+j .
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Technical Appendix.
1. Labor supply and labor demand of type i.
Households maximize intertemporal utility subject to a budget constraint. Unlike Smets and
Wouters (2007), there is a representative household that provides all types of labor services.
Thus, instantaneous utility is
1
1  c
 
Ct   CAt 1
1 c
exp

c   1
1 + l
Z 1
0
(Lst (i))
1+l di

;
where c, l > 0, Ct is current consumption of the household, CAt 1 is lagged aggregate con-
sumption and Lst (i) is the supply of labor of the type employed in the i-th rm. The houshold
budget constraint is
Ct + It +
Bt
exp("bt)(1+Rt)Pt
  Tt = Z 1
0
(1 ut(i))Wt(i)Lst (i)
Pt
di+
Rkt ZtKt 1
Pt
  a (Zt)Kt 1 + Bt 1Pt 1 (1 + t)
 1 + MtPt  
Mt 1
Pt 1 (1 + t)
 1 + DivtPt :
The rst order conditions for consumption and labor supply of type i that result from the
household optimizing program are
 
Ct   CAt 1
 c
exp

c 1
1+l
Z 1
0
(Lst (i))
1+l di

  t = 0; (Cfoct )
  (c   1)Lt(i)l
h
1
1 c
 
Ct   CAt 1
1 ci
exp

c 1
1+l
Z 1
0
(Lst (i))
1+l di

+ t
(1 ut(i))Wt(i)
Pt
= 0;
(Lfoct (i))
where t is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint in period t. Inserting (C
foc
t ) in
(Lfoct (i)) and rearranging terms leads to the optimal supply of i-type labor
Lst (i) =
 
(1  ut(i)) Wt(i)Pt
Ct   CAt 1
!1=l
;
which in log-linear terms is
lst (i) =
1
l

logWt(i)  pt   11 un (ut(i)  un)  1(1 =) (ct   (=) ct 1)

Meanwhile, the labor demand of rm i is obtained from the loglinear version of equation (5),
1 

Kdt (i)
Ldt (i)
= Wt(i)=Pt
rkt
,
ldt (i) = k
d
t (i)  logWt(i) + pt + log rkt :
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As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the loglinearized production function, with technology shocks
"at , is yt(i) = (1  ) ldt (i)+kdt (i)+"at ; which determines the log of rm-specic capital demand
kdt (i) =
1


yt(i)  (1  ) ldt (i)  "at

:
Substituting the value of kdt (i) from the last expression in the labor demand equation and
rearranging terms results in
ldt (i) = yt(i)   (logWt(i)  pt) +  log rkt   "at :
As discussed in Woodford (2003, p. 168), the Kimball (1995) scheme for the aggregation of
goods also used in the Smets and Wouters (2007)s model, yields a log approximation of
demand-determined relative output that is inversely related to the relative price,
yt(i) = yt    ePt(i);
where  > 0 denes the elasticity of demand and the relative price is ePt(i) = logPt(i)  logPt =
logPt(i) 
R 1
0 logPt(i)di. Inserting yt(i) = yt    ePt(i) in the labor demand equation gives
ldt (i) = yt    ePt(i)   (logWt(i)  pt) +  log rkt   "at :
Summing up across all rms and taking the di¤erence between rm-specic and aggregate values
results in a rm-specic labor demand equation
ldt (i) =   ePt(i)  fWt(i) + lt;
which introduces lt as the log deviation from steady state of demand-determined employment
obtained from the aggregation of log deviations on rm-specic labor demand lt =
R 1
0 l
d
t (i)di.
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2. Derivation of equation (15): The dynamics of relative labor-clearing wages.
The equation of the relative nominal wage, (13) in the main text, is:
fW t (i) =  (1 w) 1l + Ewt 1Pj=0jjw

1+1=l
1 un (ut+j   un) +  ePt+j(i) Et 1P
j=1

j
jw
 
wt+j 1 + (1  w) "wt+k   wt+j

:
(A1)
We want to express the expected stream of relative prices, Ewt
P1
j=0 
j
jw
ePt+j(i), as a function
of the relative price current value in order to have an expression for fW t (i) consistent with (14b).
Beginning with ePt+1(i), the Calvo aggregation scheme implies
E
w
t
ePt+1(i) = p  ePt(i) + pt   Ett+1+  1  pEwt eP t+1(i); (A2)
where the second term is Ewt eP t+1(i) = Et eP t+1 + 1fW t (i) using (14a) in t + 1 conditional on
having a labor-clearing wage contract set in t. Using that information in (A2) yields
E
w
t
ePt+1(i) = p  ePt(i) + pt   Ett+1+  1  p Et eP t+1 + 1fW t (i) : (A3)
The Calvo aggregation scheme implies eP t+1 = p1 p (t+1   pt). Taking rational expectations
and substituting in (A3), this equation becomes:
E
w
t
ePt+1(i) = p ePt(i) + 1  1  pfW t (i): (A4)
Analogously to (A3), Ewt ePt+2(i) is a linear combination of non-adjusted relative prices and
optimal relative prices:
E
w
t
ePt+2(i) = p Ewt ePt+1(i) + pEtt+1   Ett+2+  1  pEwt eP t+2(i);
where using (A4) for Ewt ePt+1(i) leads to
E
w
t
ePt+2(i) = p p ePt(i) + 1  1  pfW t (i) + pEtt+1   Ett+2+  1  pEwt eP t+2(i):
(A5)
Recalling (14a) in period t+2 conditional on the lack of wage resetting, Ewt eP t+2(i) = Et eP t+2+
1E
w
t
fW t+1(i) = Et eP t+2 + 1 fW t (i) + wt + (1  w)Et"wt+1   Etwt+1, (A5) becomes
E
w
t
ePt+2(i) = p p ePt(i) + 1  1  pfW t (i) + pEtt+1   Ett+2
+
 
1  p
 
Et eP t+2 + 1 fW t (i) + wt + (1  w)Et"wt+1   Etwt+1 ;
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where using eP t+2 = p1 p (t+2   pt+1) simplies to
E
w
t
ePt+2(i) = 2p ePt(i)+1  1  2pfW t (i) 1  1  p  Etwt+1   wt   (1  w)Et"wt+1 : (A6)
A generalization of (A4) and (A6) results in the following rule:
E
w
t
ePt+j(i) = jp ePt(i)+1  1  jpfW t (i) 1Et j 1P
k=1

1  j kp
  
wt+k   wt+k 1   (1  w)Et"wt+k

;
implying the following expected sum of discounted relative prices:
E
w
t
1P
j=0

j
jw
ePt+j(i) = 11 wp ePt(i)
+ 1

w
1 w
  wp
1 wp
 fW t (i)  Et 1P
j=1

j
jw
 
wt+j   wt+j 1   (1  w)Et"wt+j
!
: (A7)
Substituting (A7) in the relative wage equation (A1), we obtain:
1 + 1w
 1l +

1  p(1 w)
1 wp
fW t (i) =   (1 w)( 1l +)(1 wp) ePt(i) (1 w)(1+1=l)( 1l +)(1 un) Et 1Pj=0jjw (ut+j   un)
+

1 + 1w
 1l +

1  p(1 w)
1 wp

Et
1P
j=1

j
jw
 
wt+j   wt+j 1   (1  w)Et"wt+j

;
that corresponds to equation (15) displayed in the main text.
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3. Derivation of equation (26) on the dynamics of relative optimal prices.
Equation (25) from section 2 in the main text indicates that the loglinearized relative price
depends upon terms on relative wages as follows
eP t (i) = A  1  pEpt 1P
j=0

j
jp

mct+j + (1  )fWt+j(i) + pt+j+Et 1P
j=1

j
jp

t+j   ppt+j 1

:
(A8)
To be consistent with the value of the undetermined coe¢ cient 1 implied by the linear relation-
ship (14a) from section 2, we must relate E
p
t
P1
j=0 
j
jp
fWt+j(i) to fWt 1(i). The Calvo scheme
applied for wage setting in period t results in
fWt(i) = w fWt 1(i) + wt 1 + (1  w) "wt   wt + (1  w)fW t (i):
Using the proposed conjecture (14b) conditional on optimal pricing in period t allows us to writefW t (i) depending upon the aggregate relative value of new labor contracts, fW t , and also upon
the relative optimal price, eP t (i)
fW t (i) = fW t   2 eP t (i);
which can be inserted in the previous expression to reach
fWt(i) = w fWt 1(i) + wt 1 + (1  w) "wt   wt + (1  w)fW t   2 eP t (i) : (A9)
Recalling that fW t = w1 w (wt   wt 1   (1  w) "wt ) from Calvo-type sticky wages, and can-
celling terms in (A9), we obtain
fWt(i) = wfWt 1(i)  2 (1  w) eP t (i): (A10)
Repeating the procedure one period ahead for E
p
t
fWt+1(i), we have
E
p
t
fWt+1(i) = w fWt(i) + wt + (1  w)Et"wt+1   Etwt+1+ (1  w)Ept fW t+1(i): (A11)
Using (14b) conditional on no-optimal pricing in t+ 1 yields
E
p
t
fW t+1(i) = fW t+1   2  eP t (i) + pt   Ett+1 ;
which can be inserted in (A11) together with (A10) and alsofW t+1 = w1 w  wt+1   wt   (1  w) "wt+1
to obtain (after dropping terms that cancel out)
E
p
t
fWt+1(i) = 2wfWt(i)  2  1  2w eP t (i) + 2 (1  w) (Ett+1   pt) : (A12)
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A generalization of (A10) and (A12) for a t+ j future period gives the following expression
E
p
t
fWt+j(i) = j+1w fWt 1(i)  2  1  j+1w  eP t (i) + 2 1  j k+1w Et jP
k=1
(t+k   pt+k 1) :
(A13)
Using (A13), the expected sum of the stream of conditional relative wages becomes
E
p
t
1P
j=0

j
jp
fWt+j(i) = w1 wpfWt 1(i)  2

1
1 p
  w
1 wp
 eP t (i)
+ 2

1
1 p
  w
1 wp

Et
1P
j=1

j
jp (t+j   pt+j 1) : (A14)
Substituting (A14) in (A8) yields
1 + 2A(1  )

1  (1 p)w
1 wp
 eP t (i) = A(1 )(1 p)w1 wp fWt 1(i)
+A
 
1  p

Et
1P
j=0

j
jp

mct+j + 
p
t+j

+

1 + 2A(1  )

1  (1 p)w
1 wp

Et
1P
j=1

j
jp (t+j   pt+j 1) ;
which is equation (26) displayed in the main text.
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4. New-Keynesian model with unemployment as excess supply of labor and
variable capital.
Set of log-linearized dynamic equations:
 Aggregate resource constraint:
yt = cyct + iyit + zyzt + "
g
t ; (A15)
where cy = CY = 1 gy  iy, iy = IY = (   1 + ) KY , and zy = rk KY are steady-state ratios.
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the depreciation rate and the exogenous spending-GDP
ratio are xed in the estimation procedure at  = 0:025 and gy = 0:18.
 Consumption equation:
ct = c1ct 1 + (1  c1)Etct+1 + c2 (lt   Etlt+1)  c3 (Rt   Ett+1) + "bt ; (A16)
where c1 =
=
1+= , c2 =
[(c 1)wL=C]
c(1+=)
and c3 =
1 =
c(1+=)
:26
 Investment equation:
it = i1it 1 + (1  i1)Etit+1 + i2qt + "it; (A17)
where i1 = 11+ , and i2 =
1
(1+)2'
with  = (1 c).
 Arbitrage condition (value of capital, qt):
qt = q1Etqt+1 + (1  q1)Etrkt+1   (Rt   Ett+1) + c 13 "bt ; (A18)
where q1 =  1(1  ) = (1 )(rk+1 ) .
 Log-linearized aggregate production function:
yt = p (k
s
t + (1  )lt + "at ) ; (A19)
where p = 1 +

Y = 1 +
Steady-state xed cost
Y and  is the capital-share in the production
function.27
26Notice that we introduce the risk premium shock "bt as expansionary, akin to a positive preference shock,
whereas Smets and Wouters (2007) introduce this same shock with the opposite sign, thus contractionary.
27From the zero prot condition in steady-state, it should be noticed that p also represents the value of the
steady-state price mark-up.
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 E¤ective capital (with one period time-to-build):
kst = kt 1 + zt: (A20)
 Capital utilization:
zt = z1 log r
k
t ; (A21)
where z1 =
1  
 .
 Capital accumulation equation:
kt = k1kt 1 + (1  k1)it + k2"it; (A22)
where k1 = 1  and k2 =

1  1 
  
1 + 

2'.
 Price mark-up (negative of the log of the real marginal cost):
pt = mplt   wt =  (kst   lt) + "at   wt: (A23)
 New-Keynesian Phillips curve (price ination dynamics):
t = 1t 1 + 2Ett+1   3pt + "pt ; (A24)
where 1 =
p
1+p
, 2 =

1+p
, and 3 = 11+p

(1 p)(1 p)
p((p 1)"p+1)(1+)

with = 2

1  (1 p)w
1 pw

:
The coe¢ cient of the curvature of the Kimball goods market aggregator is xed in the es-
timation procedure at "p = 10 as in Smets and Wouters (2007).28
 Optimal demand for capital by rms
  (kst   lt) + wt = log rkt : (A25)
 Unemployment rate equation, using ut = un+(1  un) (lst   lt) and the aggregation of log
supply of labor at rm level, Lst (i) =

(1 ut(i))Wt(i)Pt
Ct CAt 1
1=l
;
ut   un = (1  un) (lst   lt) = (1 u
n)
l

wt   11 un (ut   un)  1(1 =) (ct   (=) ct 1)

  (1  un) lt;
1 + 1l

(ut   un) = (1 u
n)
l
wt   (1 u
n)
l(1 =) (ct   (=) ct 1)  (1  u
n) lt; (A26)
where lst denotes log-uctuations of the aggregate labor supply and lt denotes log-uctuations
of demand-determined aggregate labor.
28Using Dixit-Stiglitz output aggregators as in Smets and Wouters (2003) or Christiano et al. (2005), the slope
coe¢ cient on the prime mark-up changes to 3 = 11+(1 c)p

(1 p)(1 p)
p(1+)

.
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 Real wage dynamic equation:
wt = w1wt 1+(1  w1) (Etwt+1 + Ett+1) w2t+w3t 1 w4 (ut   un)+w5
 
"wt   Et"wt+1

;
(A27)
where w1 = 11+ , w2 =
1+w
1+
; w3 =
w
1+
; w4 =
1
1+
(1 w)(1 w)(1+ 1l )
w(
 1
l +)(1 un)(1+)
with  =
1w
 1l +

1  p(1 w)
1 wp

, and w5 = 1 w1+ .
 Monetary policy rule, a Taylor-type rule for nominal interest rate management:
Rt = Rt 1 + (1  ) [rt + rY (yt   ypt )] + rMy

(yt   ypt ) 
 
yt 1   ypt 1

+ "Rt : (A28)
Potential (natural-rate) variables are obtained assuming exible prices, exible wages and
shutting down price mark-up and wage indexation shocks. They are denoted by adding a
superscript p.
 Flexible-price condition (no price mark-up uctuations, pt = mplt   wt = 0):
 (ks;pt   lpt ) + "at = wpt : (A29)
 Flexible-wage condition (no wage cost-push shock uctuations, (1  un) WtPt = mrst and
ls;pt = l
p
t ):
wpt = ll
p
t +
1
1 =
 
cpt   =cpt 1

: (A30)
 Potential aggregate resources constraint:
ypt = cyc
p
t + iyi
p
t + zyz
p
t + "
g
t : (A31)
 Potential consumption equation:
cpt = c1c
p
t 1 + (1  c1)Etcpt+1 + c2
 
lpt   Etlpt+1
  c3  Rpt   Etpt+1+ "bt : (A32)
 Potential investment equation:
ipt = i1i
p
t 1 + (1  i1)Etipt+1 + i2qpt + "it: (A33)
 Arbitrage condition (value of potential capital, qpt ):
qpt = q1Etq
p
t+1 + (1  q1)Etrk;pt+1  
 
Rpt   Etpt+1

+ c 13 "
b
t : (A34)
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 Log-linearized potential aggregate production function:
ypt = p (k
s;p
t + (1  )lpt + "at ) : (A35)
 Potential capital (with one period time-to-build):
ks;pt = k
p
t 1 + z
p
t : (A36)
 Potential capital utilization:
zpt = z1 log r
k;p
t : (A37)
 Potential capital accumulation equation:
kpt = k1k
p
t 1 + (1  k1)ipt + k2"it: (A38)
 Potential demand for capital by rms (log rk;pt is the log of the potential rental rate of
capital):
  (ks;pt   lpt ) + wpt = log rk;pt : (A39)
 Monetary policy rule (under exible prices and exible wages):
Rpt = R
p
t 1 + (1  ) [rpt ] + "Rt : (A40)
Equations-and-variables summary
- Set of equations:
Equations (A15)-(A40) determine solution paths for 26 endogenous variables. The subset
(A29)-(A40) is introduced to solve the potential (natural-rate) block of the model.
- Set of variables:
Endogenous variables (26): yt, ct, it, zt, lt, Rt, t, qt, log rkt , k
s
t , kt, 
w
t , 
p
t , wt, y
p
t , c
p
t , i
p
t , z
p
t ,
lpt , R
p
t , 
p
t , q
p
t , log r
k;p
t , k
s;p
t , k
p
t , and w
p
t .
Predetermined variables (12): ct 1, it 1, kt 1, t 1, wt 1, Rt 1, yt 1, y
p
t 1, c
p
t 1, i
p
t 1, k
p
t 1,
and Rpt 1.
Exogenous variables (8): AR(1) technology shock "at = a"
a
t 1+at ;AR(1) risk premium shock
"bt = b"
b
t 1 + bt ; AR(1) exogenous spending shock cross-correlated to technology innovations
"gt = g"
g
t 1+
g
t +ga
a
t ; AR(1) investment shock "
i
t = i"
i
t 1+it; AR(1) monetary policy shock
"Rt = R"
R
t 1+ Rt ; ARMA(1,1) price mark-up shock "
p
t = p"
p
t 1+ 
p
t  ppt 1, and ARMA(1,1)
wage mark-up shock "wt = w"
w
t 1 + wt   wwt 1:
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5. Model comparison.
In order to recover the Smets and Wouters (2007) model, we must introduce the following
modications in equations (A24), (A26) and (A27):
i) New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (price ination dynamics):
t = 1t 1 + 2Ett+1   SW3 pt + "pt ; (A24)
where 1 =
p
1+p
, 2 =

1+p
, and 3 = 11+p

(1 p)(1 p)
p((p 1)"p+1)

. Notice the changes in the slope
coe¢ cient SW3 > 3.
ii) Wage mark-up (log di¤erence between the marginal rate of substitution between working
and consuming and the real wage) which replaces the rate of unemployment present in the CMV
model:
wt = wt  mrst = wt  

llt +
1
1 = (ct   =ct 1)

(A26)
iii) Real wage dynamic equation:
wt = w1wt 1 + (1  w1) (Etwt+1 + Ett+1)  w2t + w3t 1   wSW4 wt + "wt ; (A27)
where w1 = 11+ , w2 =
1+w
1+
, w3 = w1+ , and w
SW
4 =
1
1+

(1 w)(1 w)
w((w 1)"w+1)

with the curvature
of the Kimball labor aggregator xed at "w = 10:0 and a steady-state wage mark-up xed at
w = 1:5 as in Smets and Wouters (2007). Notice the new slope coe¢ cient w
SW
4 .
In addition, the coe¢ cient c2 from equations (A16) and (A32) su¤ers a slight change to
accommodate the fact that there is a wage mark-up in the SW model. In turn, the coe¢ cient
to be used in the SW model is c2 =
[(c 1)wL=(wC)]
c(1+=)
.
The set of variables is identical in the two models except for the replacement of the rate
of unemployment, ut, instead of the wage mark-up wt . In turn there are 26 equations and 26
endogenous variables in both models.
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